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STATE OF UTAH. 
Psdnmii/AppLiiuiiL. 
vs. 
TRAC'V MANUH vJALI)bZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20010772-CA 
Prion h No 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This c .• ,..*. ~r;-- i • 
Utah Code Annotated § ?S-18;i • i iKl)[a) and 78-2a-3< 2)(j) (Supp 2Uo i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. ' ""Alulliti llir Uiiil iiii ion n i h 'vnHiiilrH ir i matter of fact and law that 
defendant was unlawMly detained by officers who had v alidly executed an, arrest warrant 
Ioi mi. it'lii• m<li\iiliml. • . 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue, I Jnderlying factual,, findings 
JII" di/tneiitially, ,im! teverseil mil"" ' I'm 'Ylrnr rrror<n Hie court's conclusions of law, 
howevei; are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards 
- -d standards lo the facts. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY P R O V I S I O N S 
'fir followiiij , i onstitulKMial provision is determinative of this issue: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State of Utah appeals from the order of dismissal and order of suppression of 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Fourth District Court. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Defendant, Tracy Manuel Valdez, was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine in a drug free zone with a prior conviction, possession of paraphernalia 
in a drug free zone, and giving false personal information to a peace officer. (R. 14). 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all charges. (R. 16-17). 
The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the case. 
(R. 51-54, 56-57). The State timely appealed the trial court's ruling. (R. 62). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. (R. 70). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On February 26, 2001, Officer Bryan Robinson, accompanied by a fellow 
officer, went to the home of Monique Young on Thornberry Avenue in Pleasant Grove to 
carry out a valid warrant for her arrest. (R. 71:5, 7). 
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2. Officer Robinson knocked on the door. Monique Young answered, and Officer 
Robinson informed her that she was under arrest. Because she was wearing boxer shorts 
at the time, she asked to be allowed to put on a pair of pants, which were back in her 
bedroom. Officer Robinson agreed, and escorted her with another officer to the bedroom. 
(R. 71: 5-7). 
3. Once in the bedroom, Officer Robinson noticed a male lying face down on the 
bed, covered with blankets or a coat. (R. 71: 6). Officer Robinson assumed the male was 
sleeping. (R. 71: 15-16). Officer Robinson couldn't see the male's hands because they 
were covered by his body or by a blanket or by a coat while he slept. (R. 71: 15). 
Officer Robinson yelled at the male to "Wake up. Let me see your hands." (R. 71: 6, 15-
16). When the male did not awake, Officer Robinson shook the male and the bed yelling, 
"Wake up. I need to see your hands." (R. 71: 6). Officer Robinson testified "At that 
point he [the male] kind of gets up and wakes up I would say." (R. 71: 6). 
4. After the male was awake, Officer Robinson asked for identification, which the 
man stated he did not have. (R. 71: 7). He then asked for the man's name and birth date, 
to which the man responded with the name of Sean Tracy Michaels and a date of birth of 
December 4, 1961. (R. 71: 7). Officer Robinson ran the warrants and an NCI check on 
that individual. (R. 71: 7). During that time, Officer Robinson overheard Monique 
Young whispering to the assisting officer that the man's true name was Tracy Valdez so 
Officer Robinson then advised dispatch Tracy Valdez with the date of birth he gave him. 
(R. 71: 7, 8). Dispatch came back with a valid statewide warrant for Tracy Valdez with a 
different date of birth of December 3, 1961 instead of December 4, 1961. (R. 71: 8). 
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5. Officer Robinson at that point again asked the man for identification to which 
the man responded by producing a Utah identification card bearing the name of Tracy 
Manuel Valdez. (R. 71: 8). 
6. Valdez was handcuffed and placed under arrest and led out to a patrol car 
where he was patted down, searched, whereby Officer Robinson discovered the 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia hidden in his belt. (R. 71: 8, 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded, based on the evidence and reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, that Officer Robinson's encounter with 
Defendant was a level two encounter, and that the officer's actions in asking for 
defendant's identification, name and date of birth and then running a warrants check after 
any fears for officer safety, if any existed, had dissipated, exceeded the permissible length 
and scope of detention and was therefore violative of Defendant's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Further, because this Court can affirm on any ground presented to the trial court, 
this Court can and should conclude that under the circumstances, that of a solitary male, 
asleep on a bed with two officers accompanying another individual under arrest while she 
retrieved an item of clothing, that any fears the officers had that Defendant might be 
armed and dangerous were unjustified and therefore the level two detention of Defendant 




THE STATE FAILS TO SHOW THAT WHEN VIEWING 
THE EVIDENCE AND ALL THE REASONABLE INFERENCES 
THAT CAN BE DRAWN THEREFROM IN A LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING, 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
The trial court correctly concluded, based on the evidence and reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, that any fears Officer Robinson may have 
reasonably had regarding officer safety had dissipated and therefore his actions of asking 
for defendant's identification, name and date of birth and then running a warrants check 
after were beyond the permissible length and scope of detention and were therefore 
violative of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
The State seeks to have the trial courts factual findings reversed on this point 
asserting that they are clearly erroneous. In making this assertion, however, the State 
fails to adequately marshall the evidence and to consider it and all the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 
Pertinent case law provides that "a trial court's factual findings will not be reversed 
absent clear error." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ [60 28 P.3d 1278. Further, to 
adequately demonstrate that a finding of fact is a "clear error," the complaining party 
"must first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. After 
marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, \\1 
n.2.3dll08. 
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The trial court found that "[a]fter the officers could see Defendant's hands and 
[k]new they were in no danger, the detention should have ended." (R. 52). The 
preliminary hearing testimony on this point between Officer Robinson and the State on 
direct examination reads: 
Q: You went back to a bedroom and you say you saw a male on the bed? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Describe what you saw? 
A: There was a male laying face down. I can't remember if it was a coat or 
blankets that were over him. I couldn't see his hands. That was a concern 
for me. So I yelled at him, you know, "Wake up. Let me see your hands." 
He wasn't responsive. I remember shaking him and shaking the bed. 
"Wake up. I need to see your hands." At that point he kind of gets up and 
wakes up I would say. 
Mr. Buhman: Did you place him into custody? 
Officer Robinson: Not at that time. 
Mr. Buhman: Who was that male? 
Officer Robinson: I asked him if he had any identification on him. He 
stated that he did not. I asked him for his name. He gave the name of Sean 
Tracy Michaels. 
(R. 71: 6, 7). 
The State asserts that based on this evidence that trial court's finding that the 
officers could see defendant's hands was clearly erroneous. However, reading the above 
dialogue, and considering the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it and the 
totality of the circumstances, indicate that the trial court's finding was reasonable and not 
"clear error." 
It was reasonable for the court to infer from the testimony and circumstances that 
defendant's hands were either visible to the officers and/or that any concerns they had 
about their safety should have dissipated when defendant "kind of gets up and wakes up." 
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(R. 71: 6). Defendant's actions of waking up and getting up were in response to the 
officer's yelling for him to show his hands multiple times and shaking him and the bed. 
The court therefore likely and reasonably inferred that when the officer testified that 
defendant "kind of gets up and wakes up I would say," that his hands had then become 
visible. When a person wakes up and gets up he/she customarily will sit and/or stand up 
thus making his/her hands visible. 
It is also reasonable for the court to infer that because the officer said nothing 
further about defendant's hands not being visible after being so adamant on that point, 
that the opposite was true. There is no testimony elicited from the State or volunteered 
by Officer Robinson that after defendant "gets up and wakes up" that his hands were still 
not visible as would have been expected and reasonable had that been the case. 
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances and the reasonable 
inferences that the court could draw from the evidence, the finding that the officers could 
see defendant's hands and knew they were in no danger was likely correct and at the very 
least certainly not "clear error." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CONTINUED 
DETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF DEFENDANT AFTER HIS 
HANDS WERE VISIBLE EXCEEDED ANY PERMISSIBLE LENGTH AND 
SCOPE OF DETENTION AND WAS THEREFORE VIOLATIVE OF 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The trial court correctly concluded that after the officers could see defendant's 
hands and knew they were in no danger, the detention should have ended. It is well-
established that a police officer may detain and question an individual "when the officer 
has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). It is also 
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well-established that any detention of a person after an initial lawful stop must be 
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761. 762 (Utah 1991). 
In the case at bar the trial court correctly concluded that the continued detention of 
defendant for questioning exceeded the permissible scope and was therefore violative of 
Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court concluded that the officers were justified, 
because of officer safety concerns, to awaken defendant to view his hands when they 
encountered him sleeping in the room where a third party currently under arrest was 
retrieving an item of clothing. The trial court also concluded that the actions of waking 
the defendant in a private residence by shaking him and the bed in which he slept 
amounted to a level two encounter.1 
Based on these conclusions, the court's reasoned that because defendant was 
detained for the limited purpose of ensuring officer safety, and because it amounted to a 
level two detention, once the defendant woke up and got up and his hands were likely 
visible, any safety concerns of the officers should have been alleviated and the detention 
of defendant should have ended. The officers were only to be present in the room for 
what should have been a very short period of time to allow an arrested third party to 
retrieve some pants. (R. 71: 6). There were two officers present with no indication the 
third party was not being cooperative and the situation was apparently well in hand. (R. 
71:6, 7). The defendant they found in the room was found and assumed by Officer 
Robinson to be sleeping. (R. 71: 15, 16). The officer's only apparent concern was not 
being able to see defendant's hands because they were covered by his body or by a 
1
 It should be noted that the State does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that the 
officer's actions and surrounding circumstances constitute a level two detention. 
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blanket or a coat. (R. 71: 15). Rather than allowing the defendant to peacefully sleep 
during the presumably minute or two it would have taken for the cooperative arrested 
individual to retrieve her pants, the officer decided to likely prolong the time in the room 
by waking the defendant to see his hands. 
The trial, court found, as discussed in Point I above, that once defendant awake and 
got up, that his hands were likely visible and therefore any concerns the officers may 
have had for their safety should have dissipated. It was not necessary and exceeded the 
permissible scope of detention, as the trial court concluded, for the officer to continue to 
detain defendant for any questioning as the only possible reasonable fear the officers 
entertained was not being able to view defendant's hands. Once the hands were visible, 
further questioning was nothing more than a fishing expedition unsupported by any 
remaining fear for officer safety and certainly not supported by any reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. 
The State also contends that the trial court's note, "that the officers also ran a 
warrant check on the name Defendant gave them, although the check would not reveal 
any information that would establish Defendant's identity" was clearly erroneous. (R. 
52). The record does not support this contention. The exchange between the State and 
Officer Robinson on this point during direct examination was as follows: 
Q. He gave you that name, what did you do with that information? 
A. I also asked — he gave the date of birth of December 4th, '61. I ran the 
warrants and an NCI check on that individual. 
Q. Was he in custody when you did that? 
A. He was not. 
Q. Goon. 
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A. When he gave that name, I overheard my — the person who I had in 
custody, Monique Young, whisper to another officefr] who was assisting 
me, stating that was not his name, that his name was Tracy Valdez. I then 
advised to dispatch to check Tracy Valdez with the date of birth that he 
gave me. They came back with a valid statewide warrant for Tracy Valdez 
with a different date of birth of 12-3 of c61 instead of 12-4 of '61. 
(R. 71:7, 8). 
It seems clear and reasonably likely based on this testimony, that of Officer 
Robinson stating that he ran the warrants and NCI check on the individual with the 
December 4th, '61 birth rate and stating he then advised to dispatch to check Tracy Valdez 
after hearing Ms. Young whisper to the other officer, that two warrants checks were 
performed and/or requested. The trial court's note that the officers ran a warrant check 
that would not reveal any information that would establish Defendant's identity is likely 
correct. At the worst the testimony is somewhat ambiguous regarding whether two 
warrants checks were requested and but suggests the reasonable inference the court made 
that this was the case and therefore this finding, if was in fact a pertinent one, was not 
"clear error" and therefore should not be disturbed on appeal. 
The State also cites cases attempting to support their proposition that the officer's 
questioning defendant about his name, identification, etc. is an inherent part of an officer 
safety investigative detention. These cases carry little if any precedential value and/or 
can be factually distinguished from the case at bar in that many of them involved 
defendants who were being investigated for criminal activity or that involved actual 
reports or some evidence that the defendants were armed and dangerous previous to any 
initiated Terry stop. 
Additionally, the citation to LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment S. 9.5(g)(3rd ed. 1996) is unpersuasive because it concerns the situations 
where an individual is suspected of committing a crime or crimes and his identification 
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could prove useful if more evidence becomes available implicating him as the perpetrator 
of that or a similar crime. In the case at hand the defendant was not a suspect in any 
crime nor was there nor does the State claim there was any reasonable suspicion that he 
had committed or was about to commit a crime. This was not an ongoing investigation of 
any crime, but rather what should have been at worst no more than a momentary 
inconvenience for the defendant to show his hands. 
Similarly, the Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15 which reads "A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions," is not probative 
because there was no reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in or going to be 
engaged in any public offense, and the officers and defendant were not in a private 
residence not a public place. 
This case should also be distinguished from Michigan v. Summers. 452 U.S. 692, 
101 S.Ct. 2587 (1981), where the Court held that a search warrant for a house carries 
with it the authority to detain its occupants until the search is completed because in this 
case the officers were not executing a search warrant but rather an arrest warrant. Their 
entry into the home was not necessary and they had aheady effected the arrest warrant by 
arresting the wanted individual who was cooperative. Therefore there was not need to 
disturb defendant's sleep or to obtain his name/identification because the officers had 
already effected the warrant they had set out to execute. 
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POINT III 
IF NECESSARY THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT AN 
ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
EXISTS LN THAT THE INITIATION OF A LEVEL TWO ENCOUNTER WITH 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT A JUSTIFIED OFFICER SAFETY EXCEPTION TO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
Defendant urges this court to review and if necessary as an alternative basis for 
affirming the trial court's roling below, to find that the level two detention initiated by 
Officer Robinson was not justified under an officer safety exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement or constitutionally permissible under any other 
exception. This court has the authority to "affirm on any ground presented to the trial 
court." State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant argued below 
through his counsel in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
to Suppress and during the suppression hearing that Officer's Robinson's actions of 
initiating a level two encounter could not be justified under any exception to the warrant 
requirement. (R. 38; 72). 
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme 
Court "established a narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement that police 
obtain a warrant for all searches. Where a police officer validly stops an individual for 
investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and 
dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover 
weapons that might be used against him." State v Warren, 2001 UT App 346, \\Z , 37 P.3d 270 
(quoting State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985)). Further, "the State must present 
articulable facts that would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude that the suspect may 
be armed" and ' "a mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient." ' Warren. 2001 
UT App. at 1J14 (quoting Carter. 707 P.2d at 659). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized two basic scenarios that may warrant a Terry 
frisk. In the first scenario "facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or factual 
context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed, such as a suspect with 
a bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he 
is armed and aggressively approaches the officer immediately upon being stopped." Id. at \\5. 
In the second scenario, "it is not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and 
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the crime being investigated that leads to the 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed." Id. at \\5. Elaborating, the Court 
recognized that crimes such as robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide, 
and dealing in large quantities of drugs are by their nature suggestive of the presence of 
weapons, but that for other types of crimes such as possession of marijuana, illegal 
possession of liquor, minor assaults without weapons, underage drinking, driving under 
the influence and lesser traffic offenses "there must be particular facts which lead the 
officer to believe that a suspect is armed." Id at \ 15. (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand there was nothing "inherent in the nature of the crime being 
investigated that would lead to reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed" for 
there was no crime being investigated and no suspect to investigate. Rather, officers had 
simply executed an arrest warrant for a third party and were present with her while she 
retrieved one item of clothing. 
Additionally, in the case at hand there were not sufficient "articulable facts that 
would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed." 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 1fl4 (quoting Carter 707 P.2d at 659). The officers went to 
the home to effect an arrest warrant of another individual. (R. 71: 5). After having 
arrested said individual without any apparent problems, two officers accompanied her to 
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a bedroom for her to retrieve some pants. (R. 71: 6, 7). In the room they found the 
defendant they found on the bed and assumed by Officer Robinson to be sleeping. (R. 
71: 15, 16). The officer's only apparent concern was not being able to see defendant's 
hands because they were covered by his body or by a blanket or a coat. (R. 71: 15). 
Rather than allowing the defendant to peacefully sleep during the presumably minute or 
two it would have taken for the cooperative arrested individual to retrieve her pants, even 
with two officers present, one to watch each individual, the officer decided to likely 
prolong the time in the room by waking the defendant to see his hands. There was 
nothing about the defendant other than his presence and his sleeping with his arms under 
blankets or a coat that would have raised any reasonable suspicion that he was armed and 
dangerous. These circumstances coupled with the fact that the defendant was not being 
investigated for any crime and was not in public but sleeping in a private residence 
support the argument that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicions that 
defendant was presently aimed and dangerous sufficient to justify initiating a level two 
detention. 
Therefore, Defendant urges this court to find that the officers lacked justification 
to detain him under the circumstances and to affirm the decision of the trial court on this 
alternative ground if necessary.2 
2
 The State also asserts that even if the officers unreasonably believed defendant to be armed 
and dangerous, that the request for defendant's name was a justifiable minimal intrusion. The 
argument lacks merit in this case because the trial court found, and it is not challenged here, that 
defendant was subjected to a level two detention which must necessarily be supported by either 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or other justification. If the officer safety justification is not 
applicable, there is no justification for the level two detention and therefore defendant's Fourth 
Amendments rights were violated at the inception of the level two detention. 
14 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant asks that this Court affirm the decision of the 
trial court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against him because either 
the police exceeded the scope of their permissible seizure of him without legal 
justification or that the officers lacked legal justification for initiating a level two 
detention of him. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2002 . 
^ ? K^M^ 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Patrick V. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellee to Kenneth A. Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 this 14th day of June, 
2002. 
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Fourth Judical District Court 
of Jtan County. State of Utah 
7 Sl-<- I - S ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTUOUKT Deputy 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TRACY MANUEL VALDEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 011400986 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being 
fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
RULING 
On February 26, 2001, Officer Bryan Robinson went to the home of Monique Young in 
Pleasant Grove with a valid warrant for her arrest. She answered the door wearing boxer shorts 
and asked to put on a pair of pants. The officer agreed and escorted her back to the bedroom. 
There the officer noticed a male lying face down on the bed. The man was evidently asleep 
because Officer Robinson had to shake him and yell at him for the man to wake up. Officer 
Robinson was concerned that he could not see the man's hands. After the man awoke, Officer 
Robinson asked him for his identification, which the man stated he did not have. The officer then 
asked the man for his name and birth date. The man responded with the name of Sean Tracy 
Michaels. Officer Robinson ran a warrants and an NCI check on that name. Officer Robinson 
had also overheard Monique Young whispering to the assisting officer after the Defendant had 
given the name of Sean Tracy Michaels that the man's true name was Tracy Valdez. Officer 
o4 
Robinson ran a warrants check on that name as well. The warrants checks turned up a valid 
warrant for Tracy Valdez. A search incident to arrest turned up methamphetamine on the person 
of the Defendant. 
Defendant argues that this situation is similar to the one faced by the passenger-defendant 
in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). In Johnson, an oflBcer pulled over a car with 
faulty brake lights. The officer noticed that the name on license was not that of the registered 
owner. Suspecting the car might be stolen, the officer asked for the name and birth date of the 
passenger and then ran a warrants check on the driver and passenger. The Court ruled that 
the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a 
warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific 
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" 
Id. at 764. 
The State here argues that this case is distinguishable in that Johnson was a level two stop 
and the current Defendant was only subjected to a level one encounter until reasonable suspicion 
to detain him had arisen. This Court disagrees. 
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the public: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion1 that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop1; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed." 
A level one encounter "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may 
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." State v. Jackson, 
805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); accord Bean. 869 P.2d at 986 ("'[A] 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police 
officer merely approaches an individual on the strefct and questions him, if the 
person is willing to listen.'") (citation omitted). "As long as the person 'remains free 
to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that 
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some 
particularized and objective justification.'" 
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With a level two stop, however, the person is seized for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, "when the officer '"by means of physical force or show of 
authority has in some way restrained the liberty"1 of a person." Hence, a level one 
encounter becomes a level two stop and "a seizure under the fourth amendment 
occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe 
he or she is not free to leave." This is true "even if the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention brief." 
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." 
Salt Lake City v. Rav. 998 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the officers had exceeded a level one encounter before the questioning 
began. The testimony was that the Defendant was shouted at and physically shaken by an officer 
before any questioning began. The encounter occurred not on a public street but in a private 
bedroom with two officers present. The officers already had someone in custody. A reasonable 
person in that situation would not have felt at liberty to disregard the officer's question or walk 
away. 
After the officers could see Defendants hands and new they were in no danger, the 
detention should have ended. 
The length and scope of the detention must be '"strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 
State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1991). While Monique Young's statement may have 
given rise to an articulable suspicion that Defendant had given the officers false information, the 
Defendant had already been improperly detained at that point. It is worthy of note that the 
officers also ran a warrant check on the name Defendant gave them, although the check would 
not reveal any information that would establish Defendant's identity. 
Ruling Page 3 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED. 
DATED this dav of Julv, 2001 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We are back on the record now on the 
preliminary hearing on the case of State of Utah vs. Tracy 
Manuel Valdez, case No. 001400986. 
Is the State prepared to proceed? 
MR. BUHMAN: We are, Your Honor. We'd call Officer 
Robinson. 
THE COURT: Tracy Valdez is present. Richard Gale 
is here in his behalf. Call your first witness. 
MR. GALE: Judge, we'd move to exclude any witnesses 
who are going to testify who are in the courtroom at this 
time. 
MR. BUHMAN: He's the only one. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
BRYAN ROBINSON 
called by the Plaintiff, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will 
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Be seated to my left. Respond to 
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cuestions fror^  counsel. You may proceed. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. Officer, please state your name and spell your last 
name. 
A. Bryan J. Robinson, R-0-B-I-N-S-O-N. 
Q. And back in February of this year, by whom were you 
employed? 
A. Pleasant Grove Department of Public Safety. 
Q. As a police officer? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And on that date, February 2 6th, did you respond to 
a home on Thornberry Avenue in Pleasant Grove to affect an 
arrest warrant? 
A. I did. 
Q. Describe what happened, please? 
A. I went there to arrest Monique Young. She had a 
valid warrant out of our city. I knocked on the door. We 
could hear people in there in the house. It was sometime 
before they answered the door. Finally the door was opened. 
Monique Young, who I knew to be Monique Young, answered the 
door. I advised her that she had a warrant for her arrest 
and advised her she was under arrest. 
Q. What happened? 
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A. She had, like, some boxer type shorts, or some 
shorts on. She requested that she be allowed to put on some 
pants. I allowed her to do that. She said they were back in 
her bedroom. I escorted her back to her bedroom where there 
was a male individual laying on a bed face down. 
Q. Why did you escort her back to the bedroom? 
A. Custody, personal safety reasons. She was under 
arrest. I wasn't going to allow her to leave my sight. 
Q. You already told her she was under arrest? 
A. I advised she was under arrest. 
Q. You went back to a bedroom and you say you saw a 
male on the bed? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Describe what you saw? 
A. There was a male laying face down. I canTt remember 
if it was a coat or blankets that were over him. I couldn't 
see his hands. That was a concern for me. So I yelled at 
him, you know, "Wake up. Let me see your hands." He wasn't 
responsive. I remember shaking him and shaking the bed. 
"Wake up. I need to see your hands." At that point he kind 
of gets up and wakes up I would say. 
Q. Did you place him into custody? 
A. Not at that time. 
Q. Who was that male? 
A. I asked him if he had any identification on him. He 
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I1 seated that he did not. I asked him fcr his name. He gave 
the name of Sean Tracy Michaels. 
Q. Sean Tracy Michaels? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is that person here in the courtroom today who 
identified himself with that name? 
A. He is. 
Q. Would you identify him? 
A. He is the defendant in the green shirt. 
MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, may the record reflect that 
he identified Mr. Valdez? 
THE COURT: It may. 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. He gave you that name, what did you do with that 
information? 
A. I also asked --he gave the date of birth of 
December 4th, '61. I ran the warrants and an NCI check on 
that individual. 
Q. Was he in custody when you did that? 
A. He was not. 
Q. Go on. 
A. When he gave that name, I overheard my -- the person 
who I had in custody, Monique Young, whisper to another 
office who was assisting me, stating that was not his name, 
that his name was Tracy Valdez. I then advised to dispatch 
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to check Tracy Valdez with the date of birth that 
They came back with a valid statewide warrant for 
Valdez with a different date of birth of 12-3 of 
"1 
he gave rr.e. 
Tracy 
•61 instead 
of 12-4 of '61. 
Q. Go on. 
A. At that point I asked the defendant if he had any 
identification. At that point he produced a Utah 
identification card from his right rear pocket. The name on 
the card was Tracy Manuel Valdez with a date of birth of 12-3 
of '61. 
Q. You said that under the name on the identification 
card there was a valid statewide warrant? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so what did you do? 
A. I then placed him under arrest for the valid 
statewide warrant, and for false personal information. 
Q. Go on. 
A. I secured him in handcuffs. I led him out to my 
patrol vehicle, while the other officer led out the other in 
custody out to his patrol vehicle. I patted him down for 
weapons. I searched his person, lifted up his shirt. He had 
a big black trench coat on. I removed that to make sure that 
it didn't have any weapons in it or items of contraband. In 
his belt, on the right side of his belt he had several small 
plastic baggies in his possession. They were kind of hidden 
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MR. BUHMAN: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. I'm handing you a plastic baggy marked State's 
Exhibit No. 1. What is that? 
A. These are the bags that were in his waistband or 
belt. 
Q. In your experience, what are those baggies used for? 
A. They usually contain items of contraband, controlled 
substances, methamphetamine, marijuana, various items like 
that. 
MR. BUHMAN: Move to admit Exhibit No. 1. 
THE COURT: "Any objection, Counsel, for the purpose 
of this hearing? 
MR. GALE: No objection. 
THE COURT: They may be received. Thank you. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 was received into 
evidence.) 
MR. BUHMAN: Go ahead and pass that up to the Judge. 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. Officer Robinson, did you continue searching him? 
A. I did. I noticed there was on his zipper, fastened 
to his zipper on his pants, fastened to a chain — 
Q. A fly zipper? 











There was like a metal vial, like -
in it. He said it was medicine, pill 
me back up. From his zi 
I have something similar to 
<.e one 
and i 
; of those type of things 

























So there's a metal vial with a chain attached to the | 
is that correct? 
Correct. 
And did you search that container? 
I did. 
What did you find? 
There was a white crystal substance in it that --
in it. It later field tested positive for 
methamphetamine. 
Q. Officer, we spoke earlier. You indicated that that 








It's at the Utah State Crime Lab. 
It's still at the Crime Lab? 
Correct. 
Did you send that up for testing? 
I did. | 
MR. BUHMAN: May I approach? 
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THE COURT: You may. 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. This is State's No. 2, a document. Is that the 
results from the Crime Lab's test of what you sent up in thar 
vial? 
A. It is. 
Q. And what are the results of that test? 
A. On the second page it states that item one 
methamphetamine was identified in the white crystal residue 
in the metal tube. 
MR. BUHMAN: Move to admit Exhibit No. 2. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Counselor, for the 
purpose of this hearing? 
MR. GALE: No objection. 
THE COURT: It may be received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 was received into 
evidence.) 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. And the place where this arrest occurred, did it 
occur within a thousand feet of any day care centers? 
A. It did. 
Q. Which day care center? 
A. I'm not sure the name. It's kind of part of the 
complex, that Thornberry Apartments. There's several 
apartment buildings and it's adjacent in the same parking lot 
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as the Thornberry Apartments. 
Q. Easily within a thousand feet? 
A. Easily. 
Q. Is there also a post office there? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Within a thousand feet? 
A. Easily. 
Q. Is there public parking at that post office? 
A. There is. 
MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, for the purpose of today's 
hearing, I had the -- I don't know her last name. I had 
Sharon --
THE COURT: Sharon Jones. 
MR. BUHMAN: -- print off two prior convictions. 
These are just the minutes. We don't have the certified 
judgments. We're asking the Court to consider these for 
today's hearing. May I approach so Your Honor can examine 
them? 
THE COURT: Let Counsel examine them first of all. 
MR. BUHMAN: He has, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. BUHMAN: One of them we will need to do further 
research. Do you want me to mark them, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: I would think so, if you're going to 
rely on them having been previously convicted of unlawful 
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possession or use of a controlled substance. 
No. 






BUHMAN: Your Honor, this is 
I proffer shows 
of a controlled 








a third degree felony. 
feet 
THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel? 
MR. GALE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: For the purposes of this hearing, it may 
be received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 was received into 
evidence.) 
MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, just for -- I don't mean to 
make any argument at this point, but because the drugs are at 
the crime laboratory, if there were an issue of admissibility 
today or the weight of the evidence, for that particular item 
we would move for a continuance to admit those as evidence in 
the preliminary hearing pursuant to Rule 1102 of the Rules of 
Evidence. 
MR. GALE: I have no objection, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GALE: 
Q. Officer Robinson, you said that you went to the 
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apartment in Pleasant Grove to a r r e s t Monique Young; i s chat 
r i gh t ? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You knew that Monique Young was at that apartment? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And when you knocked on the door, -#wn you said you 
heard some noise inside the apartment; is that right? 
A. There was people -- you could tell there was people 
walking around in there. You knew that there was somebody in 
there. 
Q. So you knew somebody was in there, and then Monique 
Young actually answered the door; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. At that time you knew she was Monique Young? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You told her that she was under arrest and that you 
were going to take her to jail, didn't you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And at that point she asked if she could put on some 
pants over her shorts; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. At that point you had completed the purpose for 
which you had gone to the apartment, hadn't you? 
A. To arrest Monique Young, yes. 
Q. And so your only purpose going back any further into 
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1 I the apartment was to get pants for her; is that correct? 
A. I wasn't the one getting the pants for her. I was 
allowing her to go back there to get the pants and I escorted 
her back there. 
Q. That was the only reason you went back there; is 
that right? 
A. It's for my officer safety, and to allow her to go 
back and get the pants. Yes, that's the only reason I went 
back. 
Q. So when you went back there into the room to get the 
pants, you said that you saw a male laying face down on the 
bed; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that male, you testified that you had to yell at 
him and sort of shake him to wake him up? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So this person was actually asleep when you got in 
the room, wasn't he? 
A. I would assume so. 
Q. And so since this person was asleep, while he was 
asleep, he certainly didn't pose any kind of threat to 
officer safety? 
A. I couldn't see his hands. His hands were concealed 
either by his body or by a blanket or by a coat. I could not 
see his hands. 
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Q. But you thought he was asleep, didn't you? 
A. I would assume, yeah. 
Q. And certainly he didn't do anything that was 
suspicious at that point, did he? 
A. It took quite a bit to get him awake. I became more 
suspicious that he would be feigning that he was actually 
asleep and just was laying there face down hoping I'd go 
away. 
Q. So the only suspicious thing was that he wouldn't 
wake up, not anything else? 
A. And that I couldn't see his hands. 
Q. You couldn't see his hands because they were under a 
coat or blanket or something on the bed? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then it was after you woke this individual up 
that you asked for ID and for the individual's name; is that 
right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And it was after you asked -- after you asked the 
question of what his name was and asked for ID that Monique 
whispered that his name was Tracy Valdez; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you didn't suspect him of giving any false 
information until after you had already asked him what his 
name was and for his ID; is that right? 
Utah State Courts 
A. Before that point, no, I did not. 
Q. Now, after you found out what his name was, you said 
that you did a Terry frisk for weapons; is that right? 
A. I don't know if I testified to that. I can't 
remember if I frisked him in the apartment or not. Is that 
what you are asking? 
Q. Yes. At some point after you found out his name, 
you performed a frisk; is that right? 
A. After he was in custody. I know for sure that I did 
frisk him, 
Q. At that point you were frisking him to determine 
whether he had any weapons? 
A. Correct. He was in custody at that time. 
Q. And so you -- when you were frisking him to see if 
he had any weapons, then you saw these plastic bags on his 
belt; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You knew those weren't weapons; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then you saw these little vials on his zipper 
chain; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you said you have a little vial there, you said 
this vial was a little bigger than yours? 
A. His vial was a little bigger than the one that I 
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1 I have. 
Q. How much bigger was his vial? 
A. This is, what, probably a quarter inch in diameter. 
I'd say his is closer to maybe a half inch in diameter. 
Q. A half inch in diameter, how long? 
A. Probably the same length, about an inch, inch and a 
half, two inches. 
Q. Now, you didn't suspect that that vial had weapons 
or anything in it, did you? 
A. No. 
MR. GALE: I don't have anything further, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. BUHMAN: Just briefly. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUHMAN: 
Q. When you entered the apartment, you saw Mr. Valdez 
asleep on the bed. Did you know that he was asleep? 
A. No, I did not know that he was asleep. 
Q. Do you recall approximately what time of night it 
was? 
A. It was in the day time. It was the middle of the 
day. 
Q. That's all right. Did you ask for his 
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identification first or just ask for his name first? 
A. I asked if he had any ID first. 
Q. Did you do anything to place him in custody at that 
time? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you frisk him at that point? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Did you tell him he was under arrest? 
A. Did not. 
Q. You indicated earlier that you searched his belt 
area and you found baggies and a vial. Did that occur before 
or after you arrested him? 
A. It was after he was arrested and taken from the 
bedroom down to my patrol vehicle. 
MR. BUHMAN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gale, any further questions? 
MR. GALE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may step down. 
State rest? 
MR. BUHMAN: If I didn't, I'd move to admit all my 
evidence. If I haven't, I'd move to admit them and I rest. 
THE COURT: I think you already have, Counsel, and 
there's --at least for the purposes of this hearing, there's 
been no objection to the Court receiving State's Exhibits 1, 
2 and 3. 
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Mr. Gale? 
MR. GALE: Judge, I don't have anything. I've 
advised Mr. Valdez of his right to testify. I believe he's 
going to take my advice and not testify at today's hearing. 
And so we'd just submit the case. 
THE COURT: I'm going to find that there is probably 
cause that the offenses were committed, and probable cause 
that Tracy Manuel Valdez committed the offenses. Is he 
prepared then to enter a plea, Counsel, to these charges, and 
you can then set it for trial? 
MR. GALE: Judge, he'd enter a plea of not guilty at 
this point. 
THE COURT: I'll show an entry of not guilty pleas 
to all three charges. How long will this take from the 
State's perspective to hear? 
MR. BUHMAN: One day, Your Honor. 
MR. GALE: Judge, we anticipate a suppression --
filing a suppression motion, and having a -- possibly having 
a hearing. I guess I'm going to need to request the 
transcript, look at the case law, and determine whether we'd 
request a hearing or just submit it on the preliminary 
hearing transcript. 
THE COURT: Do so within what period of time, 20 
days? 
MR. GALE: That would be great, Judge. 
Utah State Courts 
THE COURT: Give 










to request a 
GALE: Judge, 
if I don't re 































the State ten day 
[. Well, you don' 
formal hearing. 
why don't we set 
quest a formal he 
we don't have an 
we going to have 
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scheduled to be in trial that day. 
4th at 1:30. 
Fine with me. 
I'm going to be out of 
June 11th. 
I'm available then. 
That's fine. 
June 





town that week. 
11th, 1:30. Counsel, will you make 
exhibits? 
I'll make the motion 
I'll grant you motion 
• 
The record will 
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lj reflect that I'm providing back to Mr. Buhman Scale's 
Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. Thank you. 
MR. GALE: Judge, we have one other issue we'd like 
to address. Mr. Valdez previously, as you know, was given a 
one year commitment and allowed work release after the first 
three months. On this case, I believe he has some bail, but 
is not going to get out of custody. What I would request, 
Judge, is perhaps that rather than have this bail, that the 
Court release him on this case so that he would be able to 
get into work release when that's available for him. 
Judge, he's going to -- as you know, he's going to 
be held for the next nine months, at least. I don't know if 
it was even three months ago that he was given the one year 
commitment. 
THE COURT: Let's revisit it when the time arrives. 
I don't think it's ripe at this point in time. 
MR. GALE: Judge, I think he has a month and a half, 
and he needs to get on to the waiting list to get into work 
release. They won't even do that until he is -- he's able 
for work release. So he's not --at this point because he's 
being held on this case with the bail, he's not even able to 
put his name on the waiting list. 
THE COURT: But didn't I allowed on the one year 
commitment the last ninety days he could go 
MR. GALE: After the first ninety days you allowed 



























him --he could go into work release. I believe that was 
probably a month ago or so. 
THE COURT: State want to be heard? 
MR. BUHMAN: I'm not very familiar with the other 
case. In this case -- has he received any drug treatment in 
the jail? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm in the kitchen. I signed up for 
the drug treatment, but they won't let me go through that 
unless I'm court ordered because all the court ordered people 
they have to shove them through. 
THE COURT: But the other case is a sexual case, as 
I -- contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 
MR. GALE: It's a Class A misdemeanor. I forgot 
what the term is. 
THE DEFENDANT: It wasn't a sexual case. 
THE COURT: Distribution of sexually explicit 
material to a minor. 
MR. GALE: Where one of his kids had access to a 
magazine, 
MR. BUHMAN: I believe there's also two warrants 
that are still outstanding. That's what they said today. 
MR. GALE: If they are, Judge, I think those are 
misdemeanor warrants, like Pleasant Grove --
MR. BUHMAN: One's a Judge Backlund and the_ other 
one is out of Sandy. 
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